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Abstract  27 
Humans make choices every day, which are often intended to lead to desirable outcomes. While we often 28 
have some degree of control over the outcomes of our actions, in many cases this control remains limited. 29 
Here, we investigate the effect of control over outcomes on the neural correlates of outcome valuation 30 
and implementation of behavior, as desired outcomes can only be reached if choices are implemented as 31 
intended. In a value-based decision-making task, reward outcomes were either contingent on trial-by-trial 32 
choices between two different tasks, or were unrelated to these choices. Using fMRI, multivariate pattern 33 
analysis, and model-based neuroscience methods, we identified reward representations in a large 34 
network including the striatum, dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and parietal cortex. These 35 
representations were amplified when rewards were contingent on subjects’ choices. We further assessed 36 
the implementation of chosen tasks by identifying brain regions encoding tasks during a preparation or 37 
maintenance phase, and found them to be encoded in the dmPFC and parietal cortex. Importantly, 38 
outcome contingency did not affect neural coding of chosen tasks. This suggests that controlling choice 39 
outcomes selectively affects the neural coding of these outcomes, but has no effect on the means to reach 40 
them. Overall, our findings highlight the role of the dmPFC and parietal cortex in processing of value-41 
related and task-related information, linking motivational and control-related processes in the brain. 42 
These findings inform current debates on the neural basis of motivational and cognitive control, as well 43 
as their interaction.  44 
Significance statement  45 
We all make hundreds of choices every day, and we want them to have positive consequences. Often, the 46 
link between a choice and its outcomes is fairly clear (healthy diet -> lower risk of cardiovascular disease), 47 
but we do not always have a high degree of control over the outcomes of our choices (genetic risk factors 48 
-> high risk despite a healthy diet). Control over outcomes is a key factor for decision-making, yet its neural 49 
correlates remain poorly understood. Here, subjects performed a value-based decision-making task, while 50 
we manipulated the degree of control over choice outcomes. We found that more control enhances the 51 
neural coding of choice outcomes, but had no effect on the implementation of the chosen behavior.  52 
  53 
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Introduction  54 
 55 
Making decisions is an integral part of our life. Most of these choices are value-based, i.e. they are made 56 
with expected outcomes in mind. Value-based choices are made in separate stages: we first evaluate all 57 
options, and then select the option with the highest subjective value (Domenech et al., 2018). After 58 
implementing the chosen behavior (Rubinstein et al., 2001), predicted and experienced outcomes are 59 
compared, and prediction errors are computed (Matsumoto et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2011; Collins et al., 60 
2017). This dopamine-mediated learning signal (Schultz, 2016) indicates the need to update our internal 61 
models of action-outcome contingencies (O’Reilly et al., 2013), which then leads to an adaption of future 62 
behavior.  63 
This process is modulated by various properties of choice outcomes, e.g. their magnitude (Doya, 2008). 64 
However, one crucial aspect has received little attention in the past: to which degree we have direct 65 
control over the outcomes of our behavior. Clearly, whether or not we believe our choices to cause their 66 
outcomes affects decision-making considerably, yet previous work largely focused on direct control over 67 
behavior (Sperduti et al., 2011) and not its outcomes. Some previous research in non-human primates 68 
demonstrated that control over choice outcomes affects valuation processes in the brain. Choice-69 
contingent rewards elicit different responses in the caudate (Izquierdo et al., 2004)  and anterior cingulate 70 
cortex (Chudasama et al., 2013), as compared to non-contingent rewards (see also Elliott et al., 2004). 71 
Importantly, in order to lead to any rewarding outcome, the selected behavior needs to be implemented 72 
as intended first. Arguably, having control over choice outcomes should affect the means to reach those 73 
outcomes. One might expect chosen behaviors to be shielded more strongly against interference if 74 
outcomes are contingent on them (Dreisbach and Wenke, 2011), as not performing the behavior as 75 
intended is potentially costly. For non-contingent outcomes the need for shielding is lower, as e.g. 76 
executing the wrong behavior has no effect on outcomes (see Waskom et al., 2014 for a similar argument, 77 
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but Botvinick and Cohen, 2014). Previous work demonstrated that implementation of chosen actions, 78 
which includes their maintenance and execution, is supported by a brain network including the 79 
frontopolar (Soon et al., 2013), lateral prefrontal and parietal cortex (Zhang et al., 2013; Wisniewski et al., 80 
2016; Loose et al., 2017). Some initial evidence suggests that rewarding correct performance of externally 81 
cued tasks indeed enhances their neural representations (Etzel et al., 2016), but this work did not address 82 
the issue of varying degrees of control over choice outcomes.  83 
Here, we report an experiment investigating the effects of control over choice outcomes on value-based 84 
decision making. We used a value-based decision-making task to assess the effects of reward contingency 85 
(choice-contingent vs. non-contingent rewards) on valuation and, more importantly, on choice 86 
implementation. For this purpose, we used a combination of multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA, Haynes, 87 
2015) and model-based neuroscience methods (Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015). We first 88 
hypothesized that reward contingency affects the neural coding of outcome values in humans, as it does 89 
in non-human primates (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Chudasama et al., 2013). We further assessed whether 90 
implementation of chosen behavior (i.e. coding of chosen tasks) is similarly affected by contingency. We 91 
hypothesized that the lateral prefrontal cortex, and especially the parietal cortex to play a key role in the 92 
implementation of chosen behavior. The parietal cortex represents chosen tasks and actions (Wisniewski 93 
et al., 2016; Domenech et al., 2018), subjective stimulus and action values (Sugrue, 2004; Kahnt et al., 94 
2014), as well as associations between choice options and their outcomes (Wisniewski et al., 2015a). Using 95 
MVPA, we tested whether task representations in these brain regions were enhanced when rewards were 96 
choice-contingent vs when they were not.   97 
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Materials and Methods 98 
 99 
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. A. Trial structure. Each trial started with the cue ‘choose’ presented on 100 
screen. After a variable delay, the task screen was presented for a fixed duration. Reward feedback was 101 
presented subsequently after each trial. All trials were separated by variable inter trial intervals. B. Tasks. 102 
Subjects were instructed to identify the visual object presented on screen, and press a corresponding 103 
colored button. The object-category to color mappings are depicted here. Note that the specific mappings 104 
were counterbalanced across subjects. Which task was implemented in each trial was chosen freely by 105 
the subjects. C. Reward contingencies. In contingent (RC) trials, one task always yielded a high reward 106 
with a higher probability (80%) than the other task (20%). Which specific task was currently the high-107 
reward task depended on the current task-reward-mapping, which changed according to a probabilistic 108 
reversal learning procedure (see Materials and Methods for more details). In non-contingent (NCR) trials, 109 
the chance to receive a high and low reward were equal, irrespective of the chosen task. 110 
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Participants 111 
A total of 42 subjects participated in this experiment (20 males, 21 females, 1 other). The average age was 112 
22.6 years (min = 18, max = 33 years), 41 subjects were right-handed, one was left-handed. All subjects 113 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and volunteered to participate. Subjects gave written informed 114 
consent and received between 45€ and 55€ for their participation. The experiment was approved by the 115 
local ethics committee. Seven subjects showed excessive head movement in the MR scanner (>4mm) and 116 
were excluded. All reported analyses were thus performed on a sample of 35 subjects. Despite the fact 117 
that the multivariate analyses performed in this experiment (see below for details) show notoriously small 118 
effects (Bhandari et al., 2017), we believe to have sufficient statistical power with the given sample size.  119 
Experimental Design 120 
The experiment was programmed using PsychoPy (version 1.85.2, psychopy.org, RRID:SCR_006571, 121 
Peirce, 2007)). In each trial, subjects were free to choose between two different tasks, and could either 122 
earn a high or a low reward for correct performance. The paradigm is described in more detail below.  123 
Trial structure 124 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross centrally on-screen for 300ms (Figure 1 A). This 125 
was followed by the presentation of a choice cue, the word ‘CHOOSE’, for 600ms. This cue instructed 126 
subjects to freely choose one of the two tasks to perform in this trial. After a variable delay period (2000-127 
6000ms, mean delay duration = 4000ms), the task screen was presented for a total of 3000ms. In this 128 
experiment, we used the same tasks as (Wisniewski et al., 2015b), in order to better compare current 129 
results to this previous experiment on value-based decision-making. The task screen consisted of a visual 130 
object presented centrally on screen (Figure 1 B). This object was picked pseudo-randomly out of a pool 131 
of 9 different objects in 3 categories: musical instruments, furniture, means of transportation. Below, 4 132 
colored squares were presented (magenta, yellow, cyan, gray), with the square positions being mapped 133 
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onto 4 buttons, operated using the left and right index and middle fingers. Subjects were given the option 134 
to choose which of two stimulus-response-mappings to apply to the presented object. For instance, in 135 
task ‘X’, means of transportation were associated with the magenta, furniture with the yellow, and 136 
musical instruments with the cyan button. In task ‘Y’, means of transportation were associated with the 137 
cyan, furniture with the magenta, and musical instruments with the yellow button. Thus, depending on 138 
the chosen task and the presented object, one of the colored buttons was correct for each task, and 139 
subjects were instructed to react as quickly and accurately as possible. We inferred subjects’ choices from 140 
their responses. Note, that the grey button was never task-relevant and was merely included to balance 141 
left and right hand responses. Furthermore, the mapping of the colored buttons on screen was pseudo-142 
randomized in each trial, preventing subjects from preparing a specific motor response before the onset 143 
of the task screen. The specific stimulus-response-mappings called task X and task Y were counter-144 
balanced across subjects. Subsequently to the task-screen presentation, subjects were given trial-by-trial 145 
reward feedback, by presenting either an image of a 1€ coin (high reward), a 10€cent coin (low reward), 146 
or a red circle (no reward). The feedback was presented for 400ms. After a variable inter-trial-interval 147 
(4000-14000ms, geometrically distributed, mean duration = 5860ms), the next trial began.  148 
Reward conditions 149 
Subjects were rewarded for correct performance on every trial. There were a total of two different reward 150 
conditions: contingent rewards (CR) and non-contingent rewards (NCR). In the NCR condition, the chosen 151 
reward in each trial was determined randomly. Irrespective of the chosen task, subjects had a 50% chance 152 
of receiving a high and a 50% chance of receiving a low reward (Figure 1 C). Subjects were instructed to 153 
choose tasks randomly in this condition, by imagining flipping a coin in their head in each trial (Zhang et 154 
al., 2013). In the CR condition, subjects performed a probabilistic reward reversal-learning task, similar to 155 
(Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007). In each trial, one task led to a high reward with an 80% and a low reward 156 
with a 20% probability (high-reward task, HR). These probabilities were reversed for the other task (low-157 
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reward task, LR), e.g., in a specific trial, task X might be the HR task, while task Y might be the LR task. 158 
Subjects were unaware which of the two tasks was the HR task, and needed to learn this from the reward-159 
feedback provided after each trial. Once they chose the HR task on 3 consecutive trials, the mapping of 160 
rewards onto tasks reversed with a chance of 25% on each subsequent trial, e.g., whereas before task X 161 
was the HR and task Y the LR task, now task X was the LR and task Y the HR task. Again, subjects were 162 
unaware of this change in reward-contingencies, and needed to learn when such a switch occurred from 163 
the reward-feedback provided at the end of each trial.     164 
At the end of the experiment, 15 trials were chosen randomly, and whichever reward was earned in these 165 
trials was paid out as a bonus payment to the subjects. One half of these trials was chosen from CR trials, 166 
the other from NCR trials, which was communicated to the subjects in order to ensure that both 167 
conditions are equally salient. Thus, subjects were motivated to maximize the reward in CR trials, choosing 168 
the HR task as often as possible. Given that rewards were randomly chosen in NCR trials, they had no 169 
influence over the earned reward in this condition.  170 
This reward manipulation was chosen to manipulate the degree of control subjects had over the outcome 171 
of their choices. In CR trials subjects made choices that were directed at earning as much money as they 172 
could, by learning the changing reward contingencies and thus controlling reward outcomes. In NCR trials, 173 
subjects were unable to control outcomes through their choices, as there were no contingencies to learn. 174 
This allowed us to assess effects of control over outcomes on valuation and implementation processes. A 175 
second important reason for manipulating reward ‘relevance’ instead of reward presence (as in Etzel et 176 
al., 2016), was that this allowed us to assess specific reward effects on valuation and implementation 177 
processes. When contrasting choices in which subjects could earn a reward, with choices in which no 178 
reward is present (e.g. Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008), any difference between these conditions might 179 
arise from unspecific processes merely correlated with the presence of reward, like attentional or motor 180 
preparation (Kahnt et al., 2014). This is mainly because strong differences in expected outcomes 181 
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immediately trigger these preparatory processes selectively in rewarded trials. In contrast, when rewards 182 
are always present, but only sometimes contingent on choices, reward expectations are much more 183 
similar across conditions. In fact, if a subject chose tasks randomly in all trials, the expected value would 184 
be identical in both reward conditions. Thus, only specific reward-related effects, like the fact that reward 185 
outcomes are a relevant factor for making choice only in CR trials, can explain potential differences 186 
between CR and NCR trials.  187 
Design  188 
Subjects performed 5 identical runs of this experiment, with 60 trials each. Each run contained 2 blocks 189 
with CR and 2 blocks with NCR trials. The length of each block was between 10 and 14 trials, and all trials 190 
were all separated by a long and variable ITI. CR and NCR blocks alternated and block order was 191 
counterbalanced across runs for each subject. Each block started with either ‘Contingent block now 192 
starting’ or ‘Non-contingent block now starting’ presented on screen for 5000ms. This mixed blocked and 193 
event-related design minimized cross-talk and interference between the reward conditions, and allowed 194 
us to estimate cleaner neural signals.  195 
Each run also contained 20% (n=12) catch trials. In these trials, subjects were externally cued which task 196 
to perform, by presenting the words ‘TASK X’ or ‘TASK Y’ instead of the ‘CHOOSE’ cue. The delay between 197 
cue and task execution was 1000ms in these trials. Catch trials were included to prevent subjects from 198 
choosing all tasks in a block at its beginning. For instance, in an NCR block, subjects could theoretically 199 
decide upon a whole sequence of tasks at the beginning of that block (e.g. X,X,X,Y,X,Y,Y,X,...), and then 200 
only implementing that fixed sequence in each trial. In order to encourage subjects to make a conscious 201 
choice in each individual trial, catch trials were included. These trials would frequently disrupt any planned 202 
sequence of task choices, making such a strategy less feasible. In order to increase the salience of these 203 
catch trials, subjects always received a high reward for correct performance. Catch trials were excluded 204 
from all analyses.  205 
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Furthermore, we ensured that the reward condition was not correlated with any other design variable 206 
(target stimulus, delay duration, button mapping, ITI duration), in order to ensure that estimated neural 207 
signals were not confounded. Lastly, multivariate pattern analyses can be biased if signal estimates are 208 
not based on trials which are IID. Thus we ensured that conditions of the previous trial were not predictive 209 
of the current trial, to make each trial as independent of all other trials as possible.  210 
Training session 211 
Subjects were familiarized with the task in a separate training session outside the MR scanner, lasting 212 
about 1h10min. Subjects first learned to perform the two tasks, were then instructed about the reward 213 
conditions and lastly performed 3 runs of the full experiment (as described above). This training session 214 
was performed to minimize learning effects during the MR session, which can be detrimental to 215 
multivariate pattern analyses. Training sessions were scheduled between 1-5 days before the MR session. 216 
Just before the start of the MR session, subjects performed 10 trials of the task in the MR scanner, in order 217 
to familiarize themselves with the novel environment. These trials were not analyzed.  218 
Additional measures 219 
After completing the MR session, subjects filled in multiple questionnaires. They answered custom 220 
questions (e.g., How believable were the instructions? How different were the reward conditions? How 221 
difficult was making a choice between the two tasks? How difficult was performing the two tasks? Was 222 
one task more difficult than the other? At which point in time did you choose the task to perform in each 223 
trial?), and the following questionnaires: behavioral inhibition / activation scale (BISBAS, Carver and 224 
White, 1994), need for cognition (NFC, Cacioppo et al., 1984), sensitivity to reward / punishment (SPSRQS, 225 
Torrubia et al., 2001), and impulsivity (BIS11, Patton et al., 1995). We also acquired pupil dilation data 226 
while subjects performed the experiment in the MR scanner. Pupil dilation data is not the focus of the 227 
current paper, and is not reported.  228 
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Image acquisition 229 
fMRI data was collected using a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner system (Siemens Medical Systems, 230 
Erlangen, Germany), with a standard thirty-two-channel radio-frequency head coil. A 3D high-resolution 231 
anatomical image of the whole brain was acquired for co-registration and normalization of the functional 232 
images, using a T1-weighted MPRAGE sequence (TR = 2250 ms, TE = 4.18 ms, TI = 900 ms, acquisition 233 
matrix = 256 × 256, FOV = 256 mm, flip angle = 9°, voxel size = 1 × 1 × 1 mm). Furthermore, a field map 234 
was acquired for each participant, in order to correct for magnetic field inhomogeneities (TR = 400 ms, 235 
TE1 = 5.19 ms, TE2 = 7.65 ms, image matrix = 64 x 64, FOV = 192 mm, flip angle = 60°, slice thickness = 3 236 
mm, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 mm, distance factor = 20%, 33 slices). Whole brain functional images were 237 
collected using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 238 
192 mm, flip angle = 78°, slice thickness = 3 mm, voxel size = 3 x 3 x 3 x mm, distance factor = 20%, 33 239 
slices). Slices were orientated along the AC-PC line for each subject.  240 
Statistical Analysis  241 
Data Analysis: Behavior  242 
All behavioral analyses were performed in R (RStudio version 1.1.383, RRID:SCR_000432, 243 
www.rstudio.com). We first characterized subjects’ performance by computing error rates and reaction 244 
times (RT). We tested for potential effects of reward condition on error rates using a Bayesian two-sided 245 
paired t-tests (using ttestBF from the BayesFactor package in R). Error trials, and trials with RTs <300ms 246 
were removed from the data analysis. In order to identify potential effects of task and reward condition 247 
on RTs, we performed a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA (using anovaBF from the BayesFactor 248 
package in R). This ANOVA included the factors task (X, Y) and reward (CR, NCR), and outputs Bayes Factors 249 
(BF) for all main effects and interaction terms. We did not expect tasks to strongly affect RTs, but did 250 
expect RTs to be lower in the CR condition, as compared to the NCR condition.  251 
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The Bayesian hypothesis testing employed here allows quantifying the evidence in favor of the alternative 252 
hypothesis (BF10) and the null hypothesis (BF01), allowing us to conclude whether we find evidence for 253 
or against a hypothesized effect, or whether the current evidence remains inconclusive (Rouder, 254 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson, 2009). Unfortunately, in classical frequentist hypothesis testing we 255 
are unable to provide evidence for the null hypothesis in a similar way (Wagenmakers, 2007). In line with 256 
previous research (e.g. Andraszewicz et al., 2015; Mertens and De Houwer, 2016), we considered BFs 257 
between 1 and 0.3 as anecdotal evidence, BFs between 0.3 and 0.1 as moderate evidence, and BFs smaller 258 
than 0.1 as strong evidence against a hypothesis. BFs between 1 and 3 were considered as anecdotal 259 
evidence, BFs between 3 and 10 as moderate evidence, and BFs larger than 10 as strong evidence for a 260 
hypothesis. Although our conclusions are based solely on the BFs, we also provide frequentists statistical 261 
test outcomes for the interested reader.  262 
Given that subjects were free to choose between the two tasks, some subjects might have shown biases 263 
to choosing one of the two tasks more often (although that would not have led to a higher overall reward, 264 
if anything biases should lower overall rewards). In order to quantify biases, we computed the proportion 265 
of trials in which subjects chose task X, separately for the CR and NCR conditions, and tested whether this 266 
value differed from 50% using a two-sided Bayesian t-test. The output BF was interpreted in the same way 267 
as in the previous analysis.   268 
Choices in CR trials were assessed two-fold. First, we quantified how well subjects performed the 269 
probabilistic reversal learning task. If subjects were reliably able to determine which of the two tasks was 270 
currently the HR task, they should have chosen that task more often than expected by chance (50%). Thus 271 
the proportion of HR task choices in CR trials is our main measure of how successful subjects were in 272 
performing the task. This measure was compared to chance level using a one-sided Bayesian t-test. 273 
Furthermore, we expected the proportion of HR choices to be higher in CR, than in NCR trials (where it 274 
should be 50%). This was tested using a paired one-sided Bayesian t-test.  275 
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Second, we assessed whether subjects were able to learn and update reward contingencies in the reversal 276 
learning task. Reinforcement learning (RL) theory suggest that such learning can take place by comparing 277 
received rewards with expected rewards, which are computed from the reward history (Sutton and Barto, 278 
1990; Collins et al., 2017). Discrepancies between actual and expected rewards (reward prediction errors, 279 
RPE) are thought to signal surprise in the brain and to guide adjustment of behavior (Daw and Doya, 2006), 280 
a process which relies on dopaminergic signals in the midbrain (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schultz, 2016). 281 
Here, we fitted a RL model to the choice data of each subject (separately for CR and NCR trials) in order 282 
to assess the learning process. Fitted RL models used simple delta-rule learning (as implemented in the 283 
rlfit package in Matlab, https://github.com/jmxpearson/rlfit). For each task choice c the expected reward 284 
Q(c) was learned from the reward history by comparing the expected and observed rewards at trial t: 285 
𝑄𝑡+1(𝑐) = 𝑄𝑡(𝑠) + 𝛼 𝑋 𝛿𝑡 286 
with  𝛿𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑄𝑡(𝑐) being the RPE, and 𝛼 being the learning rate. Choices were generated following a 287 
softmax choice function (as implemented in the rlfit package). The parameters were fitted over n = 10 288 
iterations, with random starting values in each iteration. Learning rates were fitted with constraints [0, 1]. 289 
In order to assess the model fit, we also estimated a ‘null’ model for each subject. In this model, we again 290 
estimated expected outcomes and RPEs using the same algorithm described above, only fixing the 291 
learning rate to 0. The null model thus assumed that subjects do not learn changing reward contingencies, 292 
and we expected our RL model to outperform this null model. Model fit was assessed using the AIC and 293 
BIC (Burnham and Anderson, 2004). We also assessed an alternative ‘hybrid’ model, in which learning 294 
rates are allowed to vary on a trial-by-trial basis, instead of being fixed for each subject (Bai et al., 2014). 295 
It has been argued that such a model better captures behavior in probabilistic reversal learning tasks. In 296 
our experiment the simple delta-rule learning model outperformed the more complex hybrid model (as 297 
assessed using AIC and BIC), and results from the hybrid model were not assessed further.  298 
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For each subject, the learning rate was extracted from the best-fitting model. We expected learning rates 299 
to be higher in CR than in NCR trials. In CR trials, the specific reward contingencies changed frequently, 300 
and thus subjects needed to update their contingency representations frequently as well. The learning 301 
rate in CR trials was also expected to correlate with successful task performance (% high reward choices), 302 
given that the reversal learning task can only be performed well if the represented reward contingencies 303 
change over time. In NCR trials, we expected learning rates to be low and uncorrelated with choice 304 
performance, because reward outcomes were randomly chosen and there were no contingencies to learn.  305 
Choices in NCR trials were assessed by testing whether subjects were able to choose tasks randomly in 306 
these trials. For this purpose, we computed the distribution of run lengths for each subject, i.e., the 307 
number of trials subjects chose to consecutively perform the same task. If subjects chose tasks randomly, 308 
this distribution can be expected to follow an exponential distribution (cf. Arrington and Logan, 2004; 309 
Soon et al., 2008). The average run length was computed for each subject, separately for CR and NCR 310 
trials, and compared to the expected run length under random choice behavior. We expected subjects to 311 
show longer runs in CR than in NCR trials, given that the probabilistic reward reversal learning task 312 
encourages subjects to perform the same task repeatedly. This was again tested using a one-sided 313 
Bayesian t-test.  314 
Data Analysis: fMRI 315 
fMRI data analysis was performed using Matlab (version R2014b 8.4.0, RRID:SCR_001622, The 316 
MathWorks) and SPM12 (RRID:SCR_007037, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/). Raw data was 317 
imported according to BIDS standards (RRID:SCR_016124, http://bids.neuroimaging.io/). In order to 318 
assess which brain regions contained information about reward outcomes and task choices, raw data was 319 
unwarped, realigned and slice time corrected. It was then entered into a first level general linear model 320 
analysis (GLM, Friston et al., 1994), and subsequently into a multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA, Cox and 321 
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Savoy, 2003; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haxby, 2012; Haynes, 2015). In order to assess which brain regions 322 
represented reward-learning signals, raw data was unwarped, realigned, slice time corrected, normalized, 323 
and smoothed. It was then entered into a GLM, adding reward prediction errors as a regressor. Results 324 
were analyzed using a mass-univariate approach. Full details of the analyses can be found below.  325 
Neural processing of reward 326 
Multivariate decoding of reward outcomes 327 
In a first step, we assessed whether we can replicate previous findings demonstrating contingency effects 328 
on reward processing (Tricomi et al., 2004). For this purpose, we estimated a GLM for each subject. For 329 
each of the 5 runs we added regressors for each combination of reward value (high vs low) and 330 
contingency (CR vs NCR). All regressors were locked to the feedback onset, the duration was set to 0. 331 
Regressors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function (as implemented in 332 
SPM12). Estimated movement parameters were added as regressors of non-interest to this and all other 333 
GLMs reported here. 334 
Baseline decoding: In a next step, we performed a decoding analysis on the parameter estimates of the 335 
GLM. A support-vector classifier (SVC, see Cox and Savoy, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2004; Kamitani and Tong, 336 
2005), as implemented in The Decoding Toolbox (Hebart et al., 2014), was used using a fixed regularization 337 
parameter (C = 1).  We performed searchlight decoding (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Haynes et al., 2007), 338 
which looks for information in local spatial patterns in the brain and makes no a prior assumptions about 339 
informative brain regions. A sphere with a radius of 3 voxels was defined around each measured voxel, 340 
and parameter estimates for high rewards (both in CR and NCR trials), and for low rewards (again, both in 341 
CR and NCR trials) were extracted within that sphere, separately in each run. 4 out of 5 runs were used to 342 
train the SVC to distinguish the neural patterns of high and low rewards. Classifier performance was then 343 
tested on the remaining, independent run. This procedure was repeated until each run was left out once, 344 
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resulting in a 5-fold cross-validation and countering potential problems with overfitting. Mean prediction 345 
accuracy was calculated across all folds and written into the center voxel of the sphere. This was repeated 346 
for each measured voxel in the brain, resulting in a 3D accuracy map. These maps were computed for each 347 
subject, normalized to a standard space (Montreal Neurological Institute template as implemented in 348 
SPM12), and smoothed (Gaussian kernel, FWHM = 6mm) in order to account for potential differences in 349 
information localization across subjects. Group analyses were performed using a random effects model 350 
on the accuracy maps, using voxel-by-voxel t-tests against chance level (50%). The chance level was 351 
subtracted from all reported accuracy values. A statistical threshold of p<0.0001 (uncorrected) at the voxel 352 
level, and p<0.05 (family-wise error corrected) at the cluster level was applied to all analyses. This 353 
threshold is sufficient to rule out inflated false-positive rates in fMRI analyses (Eklund et al., 2016). Any 354 
regions surpassing this threshold were used as masks for the following decoding analyses (an approach 355 
previously used by (Loose et al., 2017). Given that we are mainly interested in differences between the 356 
baseline and other analyses, this comparison does not constitute a case of double dipping. Please also 357 
note that this analysis is sensitive to differences in outcome value, but might possibly also identify brain 358 
regions related to unspecific preparatory (e.g., attentional) processes. Although preparatory processes 359 
should be identical in CR and NCR trials, due to the fact that the same high and low rewards were given in 360 
both conditions, we cannot fully exclude such effects either if subjects were generally more motivated to 361 
perform CR than NCR trials. The underlying cause of any observed effects remain differences in reward 362 
outcomes however.   363 
Differences in reward outcome coding: Although the baseline decoding analysis should have the maximum 364 
power to detect any outcome-related brain regions, results do not allow us to conclude whether outcome 365 
processing differed between CR and NCR trials. For this purpose, we repeated the decoding analysis, now 366 
only using CR trials, and only NCR trials, respectively. If contingent rewards indeed enhance encoding of 367 
reward outcomes in the brain, we should see higher accuracies in the CR than in the NCR decoding 368 
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analysis. Please note, that we only used half the number of trials as before, thus considerably reducing 369 
the signal-to-noise ratio in these analyses. We thus expected lower statistical power and smaller effects. 370 
Similarities in in reward outcome coding: Previous work demonstrated that not all brain regions show a 371 
contingency-related modulation of value signals (Elliott et al., 2004), and we thus tested whether some 372 
brain regions encoded reward outcomes invariantly across the contingency conditions. We trained a 373 
classifier to discriminate between high and low reward outcomes in the CR condition, and tested its 374 
performance in the NCR condition, and vice versa. This resulted in two accuracy maps per subject, which 375 
were averaged and then entered into a group analysis just like in the previous analyses. Importantly, only 376 
brain regions where patterns do not differ across both contingency conditions will show above-chance 377 
accuracies in this analysis. This so-called cross classification analysis can be used to identify brain regions 378 
in which outcome representations are invariant with respect to the contingency manipulation employed 379 
here (see also Kaplan et al., 2015), thus providing positive evidence for contingency-invariant coding of 380 
reward outcomes.   381 
Neural correlates of reward-learning signals 382 
While the previous analyses investigated the neural correlates of processing the hedonic value of reward 383 
outcomes, here, we directly assessed whether reward-learning signals are affected by reward 384 
contingency. Reward prediction errors (RPE) act as learning signals in our reversal learning task 385 
(Matsumoto et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2011). They indicate the need to update the internal model of the 386 
current task-reward associations (e.g. task X = high reward task). In order to identify brain regions 387 
encoding this important reward signal, we used a model-based fMRI approach (O’Doherty et al., 2007; 388 
Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015). In model-based fMRI, a computational model fitted to behavioral 389 
data is used to construct regressors, which are then used to estimate GLMs on fMRI data. This approach 390 
links brain and behavior in a mechanistic framework and has been used successfully in a number of 391 
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different settings (for an overview see Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015). We used the reinforcement 392 
learning models fitted to the behavioral data, and computed trial-by-trial RPEs from the best fitting model 393 
of each subject. We then estimated two separate GLMs, one for CR trials and one for NCR trials, on 394 
normalized and smoothed raw data. For each of the 5 runs, we added one regressor (duration = 0) locked 395 
to the onset of the feedback screen of each trial. Prediction errors should be strongest at this point in 396 
time. We added the trial-by-trial RPEs as a parametric modulator, allowing us to identify brain regions 397 
correlating with RPE signals. As before, regressors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic 398 
response function. For each subject, a t-contrast map was computed to identify regions reflecting RPEs. 399 
These maps were then entered into a group level random effects analysis (within-subjects ANOVA with 400 
the factor contingency (CR, NCR)) in order to identify brain regions where prediction errors were 401 
modulated by reward contingency. Results were thresholded at p < 0.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel level, 402 
p <0.05 (FWE corrected) at the cluster level. 403 
Multivariate decoding of tasks 404 
All analyses described above aimed at assessing effects of reward contingency on reward processing. Now, 405 
we turn to also test whether any such potential effects could be demonstrated on the implementation of 406 
chosen behavior in the brain. For this purpose, we assessed which brain regions encoded the chosen tasks. 407 
Two GLMs were estimated for each subject, one modelling task-related brain activity at the time of 408 
decision-making, and one modelling activity during a subsequent maintenance phase. It has been shown 409 
that formation and maintenance of intentions rely on partly dissociable brain networks (Bunge et al., 410 
2003; Gilbert, 2011), and our design allowed us to estimate independent signals related to both epochs 411 
as they were separated by a variable inter-trial-interval.  412 
In the first GLM (GLMmaintenance), for each of the 5 runs we added regressors for each combination of chosen 413 
task (task X, task Y) and reward contingency (CR, NCR). All 4 regressors were locked to the cue onset, the 414 
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duration was set to cover the whole delay period. Please note that due to the jittered delay period 415 
duration, the modelled signals were dissociated from the task execution and feedback presentation. 416 
These boxcar regressors were then convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function. This 417 
model is highly similar to the model used in  (Wisniewski et al., 2016), where subjects were also free to 418 
choose one of two different tasks in each trial, making current results highly comparable to this previous 419 
study. In sum, this model estimated task-specific brain activity during intention maintenance, i.e. while 420 
subjects had to represent their intention to perform a specific chosen task, without yet being able to 421 
prepare a specific motor response. A second GLM was estimated (GLMdecisiontime), in order to extract task-422 
specific brain activity at the time subjects made their choice which of the two tasks to perform. Note that 423 
although the cue suggested that subjects should make a task choice at that point in time, there is no strong 424 
way of controlling the exact point in time at which choices were made. In fact, choices could have been 425 
made earlier than the presentation of the choice cue. It has been shown before that under free choice 426 
conditions, subjects choose a task as soon as all necessary information to make a choice is available 427 
(Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007; Wisniewski et al., 2015b). In this experiment, this time point is the 428 
feedback presentation of the previous trial. At this point, subjects can judge whether they e.g. chose the 429 
HR or LR task and determine which of the two tasks to perform in the next trial. We used this approach 430 
successfully in a previous experiment (Wisniewski et al., 2015b), again making current results highly 431 
comparable with these previous findings. All further task decoding analyses were performed on both 432 
GLMs.  433 
Baseline decoding: The task decoding analyses followed the same logic as the reward outcome analyses 434 
described above. We first performed a searchlight decoding analysis (radius = 3 voxels, C = 1), contrasting 435 
parameter estimates for tasks X and Y in all trials (CR and NCR combined). This analysis has the maximum 436 
power to detect any brain regions containing task information, which can be notoriously difficult 437 
(Bhandari et al., 2017). Resulting accuracy maps were normalized, smoothed (6mm FWHM), and entered 438 
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into a random effects group analysis (t-test vs chance level, 50%). Results were thresholded at p<0.001 439 
(uncorrected) at the voxel level, and p<0.05 (family-wise error corrected) at the cluster level. Again, 440 
regions surpassing this threshold were used to define functional regions-of-interest for the following 441 
decoding analyses (see Loose et al., 2017).  442 
Differences in task coding: In order to assess whether task coding is modulated by reward contingency, 443 
we repeated the decoding analysis separately for CR and NCR trials.  If contingent rewards indeed increase 444 
task shielding in the brain, we should see higher accuracies in the CR than in the NCR decoding analysis. 445 
This effect should be especially pronounced if both tasks are similar and easily confused, which is the case 446 
in our experiment. Please note, that we again only used half the number of trials as before, reducing the 447 
signal-to-noise ratio in these analyses. We thus expected lower statistical power and smaller effects.  448 
Similarities in task coding: Some previous work suggests that tasks are encoded in a context-invariant 449 
format in the brain (Zhang et al., 2013; Wisniewski et al., 2016), and we directly tested whether this was 450 
also true in this experiment. Using a cross-classification (xclass) approach, we trained a classifier on CR 451 
trials and then tested it on NCR trials (and vice versa). And brain regions showing above chance decoding 452 
accuracies in this analysis provides positive evidence of task coding that is invariant with respect to 453 
contingent vs non-contingent reward outcomes.  454 
Region of interest analyses: We also assessed task information in a number of a priori defined regions of 455 
interest (ROI). First, we attempted to replicate results from one of our previous experiments (Wisniewski 456 
et al. 2015). There, the dmPFC has been found to encode task choices at the time of decision-making. We 457 
extracted this functional ROI, and tested whether we could replicate the finding in this independent and 458 
larger sample. Although the overall design differed considerably (e.g. 3 vs 2 tasks, changing reward 459 
outcomes vs changing task difficulty), both studies used the same object-categorization task. Second, two 460 
previous experiments found task information to be maintained in the fronto-parietal cortex in a context 461 
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invariant fashion (Loose et al. 2017; Wisniewski et al. 2016). In one paper, task coding was invariant with 462 
respect to freely chosen vs. externally cued tasks (Wisniewski et al. 2016), while in the other paper, task 463 
coding was invariant with respect to high vs. low control demands (Loose et al. 2017). If we were to show 464 
that the regions identified in these two experiments also encode tasks invariantly across reward 465 
contingency conditions, that would provide additional evidence for general, context invariant task coding 466 
in the fronto-parietal cortex. We thus extracted functional ROIs from both papers (Wisniewski et al. 2016: 467 
left parietal cortex, left PFC, Brodman area 8; Loose et al. 2017: left parietal cortex, left PFC), and tested 468 
this hypothesis in this independent data-set. For all ROIs defined, we extracted accuracy values for all 469 
voxels within the ROI, which were then averaged. One-sided Bayesian t-tests across subjects were 470 
performed to assess whether they were above chance.  471 
Control analyses: In order to further corroborate the reliability of our results, we performed a number of 472 
control analyses. It has been pointed out before, that RT effects might partly explain task decoding results 473 
(Todd et al., 2013), although others were unable to show any such effects (Woolgar et al., 2014; 474 
Wisniewski et al., 2015b). Given that we expected RTs to differ across reward conditions, we decided to 475 
conservatively control for RTs effects. First, we repeated the GLM estimation, only adding reaction times 476 
as an additional regressor of non-interest. We then repeated the main decoding analyses, and tested 477 
whether accuracy values differed significantly. If RTs indeed explain our task decoding results, we should 478 
see a reduction in decoding accuracies when RT effects were regressed out of the data.  479 
Furthermore, it is possible that some subjects exhibit excessive error rates or have a strong bias to choose 480 
one task more often than the other. High error rates might decrease the signal-to-noise ratio and thus 481 
affect observed results. Very strong choice biases might have a similar effect, in extreme cases subjects 482 
might have performed only one of the two tasks in a given run (although this was unlikely). In order to 483 
ensure that we had enough trials to estimate each regressor, we first excluded subjects with excessively 484 
high error-rates (more than 1.5*IQR above average), and then excluded subjects with strong choice biases 485 
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(more than 1.5*IQR above average). We then tested whether each regressor in all remaining subjects 486 
could be estimated from at least 6 trials. If a regressor could only be estimated from fewer trials, that run 487 
was excluded from the analysis. Subjects in which more than 1 run was thusly excluded were altogether 488 
excluded from the analysis. These criteria were highly similar to the criterion used in (Wisniewski et al., 489 
2015b), which proved an effective control. After excluding these subjects, we repeated the main analyses 490 
on the remaining subjects and tested whether they differed from the analysis including all subjects.  491 
Two further control analyses were performed to confirm the validity of the decoding procedure used. 492 
First, we performed a ROI decoding analysis on a brain region that is not related to task-performance in 493 
any way, expecting accuracies to be at chance level. We chose the primary auditory cortex for this 494 
purpose, defined using the WFU_pickatlas tool (https://www.nitrc.org/frs/?group_id=46, RRID: 495 
SCR_007378). Second, we tested whether our chance level was indeed 50%, or whether it was biased. For 496 
this purpose, we performed a permutation analysis (as implemented in the Decoding Toolbox). We 497 
repeated the baseline decoding analysis 1000 times for each subject, only randomly assigning the test 498 
labels in each of the 1000 permutations. A null distribution was calculated from these permutations 499 
separately for each subject, and the mean accuracy value of the null distribution served as an empirical 500 
estimate of the chance level. In order to test whether the estimated chance level deviated from 50%, we 501 
performed a two-sided Bayesian t-test. Additional exploratory analyses were performed to assess possible 502 
correlations between behavioral measures, questionnaires, and fMRI results (Figure 2–1).  503 
  504 
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Results 505 
 506 
Figure 2. Behavioral Results. A. Reaction Times (RT). The bar graph depicts the average reaction times for 507 
each combination of task and reward condition. Contingent (CR) trials are shown in black, non-contingent 508 
(NCR) trials are shown in grey. The violin plot depicts the RT distributions of the same data. B. Choice run 509 
length. This plot depicts the distribution of run lengths (the number of consecutive trials in the same task). 510 
Data from CR trials is shown in black, data from NCR trials is shown in grey. The expected distribution if 511 
choices were completely random is depicted in light grey. All error bars depict the SEM. C. Correlation of 512 
learning rate and success. Learning rates were extracted form a fitted RL model. Success was measured 513 
as % HR task choices. In CR trial, subjects who learned the changing reward contingencies quickly, were 514 
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more successful. In NCR, no such correlation was observed. Each dot represents one subject, and linear 515 
functions were fitted to the data (lines). Further information on correlations between performance and 516 
additional questionnaire measures can be found in Supplementary Figure 1. 517 
  518 
Behavioral results 519 
We first assessed the effects of tasks (X, Y) and reward condition (CR, NCR) on error rates and reaction 520 
times (RT). The average error rate across all subjects was 5.89% (SEM = 0.74%). Thus, subjects were able 521 
to perform the task accurately. There was no evidence for an effect of reward condition on error rates 522 
(Bayes Factor (BF10) = 0.88, t(34) = 1.96, p = 0.06). Error trials were removed from all further analyses. A 523 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the reaction times (RT) including the factors task and reward condition 524 
revealed no main effect of reward (BF01 = 31.95, F(1,34) = 0.38, p = 0.53, Figure 2 A). This is likely due to 525 
the fact that subjects had a long time to prepare the execution of the task, which minimized potential 526 
contingency-related differences in RTs. There was a strong main effect of task however (BF10 > 150, 527 
F(1,34) = 3.78, p = 0.05), with task X (RTX = 1415ms, SEM = 29ms) being faster than task Y (RTY = 1467ms, 528 
SEM = 35ms). Please note, that this cannot be simply due to a difficulty difference between the two S-R-529 
mappings called task X and task Y, as the specific S-R-mappings were counter-balanced across subjects. 530 
Given the long delay phase, subjects should have had enough time to prepare both tasks well, and we 531 
were somewhat surprised to see this RT difference. This results might reflect the encoding sequence in 532 
the learning phase. Subjects might have learned the S-R-mapping labelled X first, and then learned the S-533 
R-mapping labelled Y second. If the second task is mainly encoded by how it differs from the first, this 534 
might lead to a RT difference (see also Lien et al., 2005). There was no evidence for an interaction between 535 
task and reward (BF10 = 0.26, F(1,34) = 6.63, p = 0.01).  536 
We then assessed whether subjects showed choice biases towards one of the two tasks, which might 537 
indicate stable preferences for specific tasks and might in turn affect fMRI analyses (see below). In order 538 
to quantify any potential choice biases, we computed the percentage of task X choices for both reward 539 
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conditions separately. Subjects chose task X in 52.14% (SEM = 1.44%) of the CR trials, and 52.29% (1.72%) 540 
of the NCR trials. These values did not differ from 50% in the CR condition (BF10 = 0.48, t(34) = 1.47, p = 541 
0.14), and NCR condition (BF10 = 0.40, t(34) = 1.32, p = 0.19). There was also no difference between the 542 
two reward conditions (BF01 = 5.45, t(34) = 0.14, p = 0.88), indicating that subjects did not exhibit strong 543 
choice biases in this experiment.  544 
Next, we measured subjects’ success in solving the reversal learning task presented in CR trials, by 545 
computing the percentage of high-reward (HR) task choices for each subject. If they were unable to learn 546 
which of the two tasks was the HR task, this value should be 50%. Higher values indicate increasing success 547 
in performing the reversal learning task. We hypothesized that subjects chose HR tasks more often in CR, 548 
as compared to NCR trials. Subjects chose the HR task in 56.40% (SEM = 1.15%) of the CR trials, which was 549 
above chance level (BF10 >150, t(34) = 5.56, p < 0.001). They chose the HR task in 49.47% (SEM = 0.84%) 550 
of the NCR trials, which did not differ from the chance level (BF01 = 4.59, t(34) = 0.62, p = 0.53). 551 
Importantly, we found strong evidence for our hypothesis that subjects chose HR tasks more often in the 552 
CR, than in the NCR condition (BF10 > 150, t(34) = 5.44, p < 0.001). These findings demonstrate that 553 
subjects indeed chose tasks strategically in the CR condition, in order to maximize their reward outcome.  554 
We then described the learning process in the CR trials in more details by fitting a reinforcement learning 555 
(RL) model (Sutton and Barto, 1990, see Materials and Methods for more details) to the choice data of 556 
each subject, and extracting the estimated learning rate (α). We expected subjects to show high learning 557 
rates in CR trials, reflecting the fact that subjects frequently needed to update which of the two tasks 558 
yielded higher reward outcomes. We compared fitted models in both CR and NCR trials to a null model, 559 
in which the learning rate was fixed to 0, assuming that subjects never learned about the reward 560 
contingencies in this experiment. Model fit was assessed using the AIC and BIC (Burnham and Anderson, 561 
2004). As expected, the RL model provided a better fit to the data than the null model in both CR trials 562 
(AICRL_CR=129.97, AICNULL_CR=159.54, BICRL_CR=132.71, BICNULL_CR=159.54), as well as NCR trials 563 
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(AICRL_NCR=158.70, AICNULL_NCR=158.90, BICRL_NCR=132.71, BICNULL_NCR=158.90). Given that reward 564 
contingencies changed frequently in the CR trials, we expected learning rates to be higher in CR than in 565 
NCR trials. We found strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis (αCR: mean = .78, median = .96, sd = .33, 566 
min/max = <.001/1; αNCR: mean = .36, median = .06, sd = .41, min/max = <.001/1; BF10 > 150, t(34) = 4.63, 567 
p < 0.001). We then correlated estimated learning rates with successful task performance (% HR task 568 
choices), again using a Bayesian framework for correlation estimation (using bayes.cor.test form the 569 
BayesianFirstAid package in R). Specifically, we estimated the probability of the correlation being above 0 570 
(p(r>0)), and also estimated 95% credible intervals (95% CI), which indicates the range of values within 571 
which the correlation falls with a 95% probability. If this interval did not include 0, we interpreted the 572 
correlation as either positive or negative. The estimated learning rate in CR trials was indeed correlated 573 
with successful task performance (% HR task choices), r = .44 (95% CI = [.026, .74], p(r>0) = .97, Figure 2 574 
C), linking our computational modelling more closely to behavior. As a control analysis, we also correlated 575 
learning rate in NCR with proportion of HR task choices in NCR trials. As expected, we found no correlation, 576 
r=-.12 (95% CI = [-.46, .21], p(r>0) = .21). Classically estimated correlations confirmed these results, r = .56, 577 
p < 0.001, and r = -.12, p = 0.46, respectively. These results indicate that successful subjects were able to 578 
learn about changing reward contingencies more quickly, and also demonstrate that subjects treated both 579 
reward conditions differently.  580 
Lastly, in NCR trials we expected subjects to choose tasks randomly, as their choices had no effect on 581 
reward outcomes (see Materials and Methods for more details). In order to test this, we computed the 582 
run length for each subject, i.e. the average number of consecutive trials in the same task (Arrington and 583 
Logan, 2004). The average run length was then compared to the expected theoretical distribution if 584 
choices were fully random (Figure 2 B). The average run length in NCR trials was 1.95 trials (SEM = 0.07 585 
trials), which did not differ from the expected ‘random-choice’ run length (BF01 = 4.85, t(34) = 0.52, p = 586 
0.60). Subjects in this experiment thus did not exhibit repetition bias, which has been reported previously 587 
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for free-choice tasks (Arrington and Logan, 2004). The average run length in CR trials was 2.54 trials (SEM 588 
= 0.08 trials), which was longer than in NCR trials (BF10 >150, t(34) = 5.91, p < 0.001), demonstrating that 589 
subjects stayed longer in the same task. This is a viable strategy in the reversal-learning task they 590 
performed. Once they identified which was the HR task, repeatedly performing that task maximized 591 
reward outcomes.  592 
Reward-related brain activity 593 
Multivariate decoding of reward outcome values 594 
One of our main goals was to assess whether reward contingency affects valuation processes in the brain. 595 
In a first analysis, we aimed to extend previous findings demonstrating an effect of reward contingency 596 
on the processing of its hedonic value (Elliott et al., 2004). For this purpose, identified brain regions 597 
encoding outcome values (high vs low) at the time of feedback presentation. We found an extensive 598 
network to encode outcome values including subcortical brain regions, as well as large parts of the 599 
prefrontal and parietal cortex (Figure 3 A). Please note that this contrast might not only capture specific 600 
reward value signals, it might also reflect effects caused by differences in reward outcomes, like attention 601 
or motor preparation. We explicitly assessed whether reaction times affected outcome coding (see Todd 602 
et al., 2013), and found no effect (Figure 3-1). Subsequently, we assessed whether these outcome signals 603 
were modulated by reward contingency, hypothesizing that contingent rewards showed stronger 604 
decoding results than non-contingent rewards. For this purpose, we repeated the decoding analysis 605 
described above, now separately for CR and NCR trials, respectively. The two resulting accuracy maps 606 
were entered into a within-subjects ANOVA, and a contrast was computed identifying brain regions with 607 
higher accuracies in CR than in NCR trials. Using small-volume correction (p < 0.001 uncorrected, p < 0.05 608 
FWE corrected), we assessed which of the brain regions identified in the baseline analysis also showed 609 
stronger value coding for contingent rewards. We found the striatum, bilateral lateral PFC, dACC, anterior 610 
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medial PFC, and IPS to show stronger reward value coding for contingent rewards, as compared to non-611 
contingent rewards. In a last step, we directly assessed whether there were brain regions that encoded 612 
reward values in a contingency-invariant fashion, using a cross-classification approach. Here, we trained 613 
a classifier to distinguish high from low rewards only on CR trials, and then tested its performance on NCR 614 
trials, and vice versa. This allowed us to identify brain regions in which outcome values are encoded 615 
invariantly across the two contingency conditions, i.e. where neural patterns do not differ across 616 
contingency conditions (Kaplan et al., 2015). We found the striatum, lateral and medial PFC, dACC, and 617 
IPS to encode rewards in a contingency invariant form. This pattern of results suggests that the neural 618 
code for different reward values did not change across contingency conditions, yet value signals were still 619 
stronger in CR than in NCR trials. This is compatible with an increased gain or amplification of value 620 
representations through contingency (Figure 3 B), where representations do not change but become more 621 
separable in neural state space (see Waskom et al., 2014 for a similar argument).  622 
  623 
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 624 
Figure 3: Reward-related brain activity. A. Multivariate decoding of reward outcome value. Above: 625 
baseline decoding. Depicted are regions that encoded the value of reward outcomes (high vs. low). The 626 
regions identified were used as masks for the following analyses. Results are displayed at p < 0.05 (FWE 627 
corrected). Middle: regions with a stronger coding of reward value in contingent (CR) than in non-628 
contingent (NCR) trials. Below: regions encoding reward values in similar formats in both contingency 629 
conditions, as tested using a cross-classification (xclass) analysis. We also repeated this analysis, explicitly 630 
controlling for the effect of reaction times, and results can be found in Supplementary Figure 2. B. 631 
Amplification vs change of format of neural coding. Most regions identified in A showed both stronger 632 
decoding in CR trials, and similar formats across both contingency conditions. This is compatible with an 633 
amplification or gain increase of neural codes. In the middle, a hypothetical example of a pattern decoding 634 
is depicted. High reward trials are depicted as blue, low reward trials as orange dots. The classifier fits a 635 
decision boundary to separate the two distributions. If this code changes between the two contingency 636 
conditions (left), decoding is still possible at similar accuracy levels as before, but a classifier trained on 637 
NCR trials will be unsuccessful in classifying CR trials. If this code is amplified in the CR condition however 638 
(right), the same classifier can will be successful in both conditions. Accuracies increase, as the two 639 
distributions become more separable. C. Brain regions correlating with reward prediction error signals (in 640 
both CR and NCR trials).  641 
 642 
 643 
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Learning signals: Reward prediction errors 644 
In the previous analysis, we assessed which brain regions directly encoded different reward outcomes in 645 
individual trials. We now turn to identifying brain regions supporting reward-based learning processes 646 
across multiple trials. We used the fitted RL models (see above) to extract trial-by-trials reward prediction 647 
errors (RPEs), which signal the need to adapt one’s behavior (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Following a model-648 
based neuroscience approach (Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015), we identified brain regions in which 649 
activity correlated with RPEs. These learning signals should be strongest at the time of decision-making 650 
(in our case the reward feedback presentation, see Materials and Methods for more details), and we 651 
found the left parietal cortex and anterior medial PFC to correlate with RPEs in CR trials (Figure 3 C). In 652 
NCR trials, we found anterior cingulate and anterior medial prefrontal cortex to encode RPEs. We 653 
statistically assessed the difference between these two results, using a within-subjects ANOVA with the 654 
factor ‘model’ (2 levels). We found no significant differences (p < 0.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel level, p 655 
<0.05 (FWE corrected) at the cluster level), and thus decided to combine both conditions to increase 656 
statistical power. Running the same analysis over all trials (CR and NCR) again revealed the left parietal 657 
cortex (overlapping with the region identified in Analysis 1), ACC and anterior medial PFC, but also the 658 
precuneus. These regions thus signal discrepancies between expected and received rewards during 659 
feedback presentation, indicating the need to adapt behavior in the subsequent trial.  660 
These brain regions could either signal general surprise, as RPEs are the difference between expected and 661 
received rewards (O’Reilly et al., 2013). They could also signal the need to update an internal model of 662 
our environment. Our findings are more in line with the former option. Any region signaling the need to 663 
update the internal model of the environment should be specifically involved only in CR trials (where 664 
updating is required), and not in NCR trials (where updating is not needed). In order to test this, we 665 
identified subjects that only showed high learning rates in CR and low learning rates in NCR trials (n=19). 666 
For these subjects, prediction errors only signaled the need to update their internal model. Results 667 
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showed that for this subset of subjects, only the anterior medial PFC correlated with RPEs (p < 0.001 668 
uncorrected at the voxel, and p < 0.05 FWE corrected at the cluster level). This seems to suggest that the 669 
anterior medial PFC was involved in model updating, while the left parietal cortex and precuneus signaled 670 
general surprise. Given that the sample size was considerably smaller in this analysis, results should be 671 
interpreted with caution however.   672 
Multivariate decoding of tasks  673 
Baseline decoding analysis: The previous analysis demonstrated that reward contingency indeed affected 674 
the neural processing of the hedonic value of reward outcomes, and possibly also related learning signals. 675 
In the following analysis we assessed whether these effects propagated to the implementation of chosen 676 
behavior, i.e. the coding of chosen tasks as well. For this purpose, we first estimated a GLM modelling 677 
task-related neural activity during the maintenance of chosen tasks, from the onset of the ‘choose’ cue to 678 
the onset of the task execution screen. (see Materials and Methods for more details, and Haynes et al. 679 
(2007) for a similar approach). During this time, subjects needed to maintain their intention to perform 680 
one of the two tasks. We performed a searchlight decoding analysis contrasting task X and task Y, 681 
combining both CR and NCR trials in order to maximize the power to detect any brain regions containing 682 
task information (see Loose et al., 2017 for a similar approach). Please note that during this time subjects 683 
cannot prepare specific motor responses yet, but they can use this time to retrieve the current S-R-684 
mapping. We found two brain regions to contain task information, the left posterior parietal cortex (mean 685 
accuracy = 4.61%, SEM = 0.65%), spanning over the midline into the right parietal cortex, and the right 686 
anterior middle frontal gyrus (aMFG, mean accuracy = 4.66%, SEM = 0.89%, see Figure 4 A, Table 1). 687 
Interestingly, the parietal cluster identified in this analysis partly overlapped with the parietal cluster 688 
found to encode reward prediction errors in the previous analysis, suggesting that the left parietal cortex 689 
is involved in both reward-learning and task processing. 690 
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 691 
Figure 4: Task coding. A. Task coding during maintenance. Results from the baseline decoding analysis are 692 
depicted above. Two clusters passed the significance threshold, one in the parietal cortex, and one in the 693 
right anterior MFG. These two clusters were then used as ROIs, and accuracies were extracted for the 694 
contingent (CR), non-contingent (NCR), and cross-classification (xclass) task decoding analyses. Results 695 
can be seen below. Above the boxplots, Bayes factors (BF10) of a t-test vs. chance level are shown. Please 696 
note, that we do not report BF10 for the baseline analysis, as this analysis was used to define the ROIs, 697 
and running additional statistical tests on this data would constitute double dipping. B. Task coding at the 698 
time of decision-making. Above the ROI in the right dmPFC used in this analysis from Wisniewski et al. 699 
(2015) is depicted. This study demonstrated that the right dmPFC encodes tasks at the time of decision-700 
making. The box plot depicts results from our data in this ROI, for all four analyses performed (baseline, 701 
CR, NCR, xclass). We largely replicate these previous findings. The dissociation plot depicts a double 702 
dissociation between two ROIs (right dmPFC, as defined using data from Wisniewski et al., 2015, and the 703 
left parietal cortex, as defined using data from Wisniewski et al., 2016), and two time points in the trial 704 
(time of decision-making, maintenance). It can be seen that the dmPFC only encodes tasks at the time of 705 
decision-making, while the left parietal cortex only encodes tasks during the maintenance phase. All error 706 
bars represent SEM. C. Overlap with previous results. Results from the current study (red) are overlain on 707 
previous findings from Wisniewski et al. 2016 (blue), and Loose et al. 2017 (green). All results are based 708 
on task decoding analyses (searchlight decoding, radius = 3 voxels, C = 1, chance level = 50%), albeit with 709 
different specific tasks being contrasted in each study. Despite this fact, all three studies find task 710 
information around the intraparietal sulcus. Findings in the PFC are less consistent. We further assessed 711 
task information encoded throughout the multiple-demand network, results can be found in 712 
Supplementary Figure 3. 713 
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Table 1: Baseline task decoding 714 
         MNI coordinates (peak) 
Brain region Side Cluster size Mean accuracy (SEM) X Y Z 
parietal cortex Bilateral 2427 4.61% (0.65%) -10 -60 60 
anterior MFG Right 955 4.66% (0.89%) 32 58 18 
Results are shown for a statistical threshold of p<0.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel level and p<0.05 (FWE 715 
corrected) at the cluster level.  716 
 717 
Differences in task coding: In a next step, we assessed whether tasks were encoded with a higher accuracy 718 
in CR, than in NCR trials, similar to what we found for reward outcomes. Previous research demonstrated 719 
higher decoding accuracies in rewarded, as compared to non-rewarded tasks (Etzel et al., 2016). We built 720 
functional ROIs from the two regions identified in the baseline analysis, and extracted the average 721 
accuracy values for the task decoding analyses performed on CR trials only, and NCR trials only. Please 722 
note that these two analyses use only half as many trials as the baseline analysis, and the signal-to-noise-723 
ratio can be expected to be lower. We found no task information in the parietal cortex in these two 724 
analyses (CR: 1.29%, SEM = 0.91%, BF10 = 1.06, t(34) = 1.59, p = 0.06; NCR: 1.73%, SEM = 1.44%, BF10 = 725 
0.64, t(34) = 1.23, p = 0.11), and found no evidence for stronger task coding in CR than in NCR trials (BF10 726 
= 0.16, t(34) = 0.09, p = 0.53). A similar pattern of results was found in the right aMFG (CR: 1.79%, SEM = 727 
1.37%, BF10 = 0.85, t(34) = 1.44, p = 0.07; NCR: 0.48%, SEM = 1.35%, BF10 = 0.22, t(34) = 0.25, p = 0.40; 728 
CR > NCR: BF10 = 0.40, t(34) = 0.84, p = 0.20). Thus, we find no evidence for an effect of reward 729 
contingency on task representations, despite the fact that behavior clearly differed between the two 730 
reward conditions, and that contingency has been found to modulate the coding of reward outcomes. In 731 
order to assess whether the lack of evidence for differences in task coding might stem from a lack in 732 
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statistical power, we performed an additional control analysis. We again performed two separate task 733 
decoding analysis, only using high reward and low reward trials (instead of CR and NCR trials), respectively. 734 
We then tested whether decoding accuracies differed between these two conditions. Importantly, this 735 
analysis has a similar statistical power, as the same number of trials is used. And indeed, we found task 736 
coding to differ between these two conditions even at the whole brain level (p < 0.001 uncorrected at the 737 
voxel, and p < 0.05 FWE corrected at the cluster level). Please note that this comparison might confound 738 
effects of reward value with attentional processes. Nevertheless, this shows that our analysis approach is 739 
able to identify differences in task coding in this dataset, although it fails to do so for our reward 740 
contingency manipulation.  741 
Similarities in task coding: We also directly tested whether task representations were invariant across the 742 
two reward conditions, using a cross-classification approach. We trained a classifier to distinguish tasks in 743 
CR trials, and tested its performance in NCR trials, and vice versa. In this analysis, accuracies can only be 744 
above chance if task coding is invariant across both conditions. Results indicate than both the parietal 745 
cortex (4.03%, SEM = 0.76%, BF10 > 150), as well as the right aMFG (3.71%, SEM = 1.16%, BF10 = 49.39) 746 
show this type of contingency-invariant task coding. We further tested whether accuracies in the cross-747 
classification differed from the baseline accuracies, finding moderate evidence for an absence of any 748 
differences (parietal cortex BF01 = 4.34, t(34) = 0.71, p = 0.47, aMFG BF01 = 3.94, t(34) = 0.84, p = 0.40). 749 
These results thus show that the parietal cortex and aMFG encode tasks using a general, reward-750 
contingency-invariant format.  751 
ROI analyses and replications: We also tested for task information in several a-priori ROIs, taken from two 752 
previous experiments (Loose et al. 2017, Wisniewski et al. 2016), which tested for effects of cognitive 753 
control, and free choice on task coding, respectively. Both previous studies found the left parietal cortex 754 
to be involved in context-invariant task coding, and we thus set out to replicate these previous results 755 
here. We extracted the ROIs reported in these two studies, and extracted decoding accuracies in each of 756 
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these ROIs, for all 4 analyses performed here (baseline, CR, NCR, xclass). We were able to replicate Loose 757 
and colleagues’ left parietal results (baseline BF10 = 133.69, t(34) = 3.89, p < 0.001; CR BF10 = 0.68, t(34) 758 
= 1.23, p = 0.10; NCR BF10 = 0.54, t(34) = 1.11, p = 0.13; xclass BF10 = 33.17, t(34) = 3.33, p = 0.001). 759 
Although somewhat weaker, we also replicated their right parietal results (baseline BF10 = 8.49, t(34) = 760 
2.72, p = 0.004; CR BF10 = 0.77, t(34) = 1.37, p = 0.08; NCR BF10 = 0.14, t(34) = 0.28, p = 0.61; xclass BF10 761 
= 8.10, t(34) = 2.70, p = 0.005). However, we were unable to detect task information in left PFC (baseline 762 
BF10 = 0.49, t(34) = 1.03, p = 0.15; CR BF10 = 0.21, t(34) = 0.23, p = 0.40; NCR BF10 = 0.44, t(34) = 0.93, p 763 
= 0.17; xclass BF10 = 0.29, t(34) = 0.54, p = 0.29), which is in line with the original paper, where PFC findings 764 
were also somewhat less robust. Additionally, we were able to replicate Wisniewski and colleagues’ left 765 
parietal finding (baseline BF10 = >150, t(34) = 4.20, p < 0.001; CR BF10 = 0.80, t(34) = 1.40, p = 0.08; NCR 766 
BF10 = 0.47, t(34) = 1.00, p = 0.16; xclass BF10 = 87.28, t(34) = 3.72, p < 0.001), as well as left BA8 (baseline 767 
BF10 = 9.3, t(34) = 2.77, p = 0.004; CR BF10 = 0.39, t(34) = 0.83, p = 0.20; NCR BF10 = 0.36, t(34) = 0.76, p 768 
= 0.22; xclass BF10 = 3.09, t(34) = 2.22, p = 0.16), but not the left PFC (baseline BF10 = 0.59, t(34) = 1.17, 769 
p = 0.12; CR BF10 = 0.37, t(34) = 0.78, p = 0.21; NCR BF10 = 0.16, t(34) = 0.15, p = 0.56; xclass BF10 = 0.38, 770 
t(34) = 0.81, p = 0.21). Thus, three studies with similar overall designs but considerable differences in the 771 
specific tasks used consistently find invariant task coding in the parietal, but not in the prefrontal cortex.  772 
Furthermore, Wisniewski et al. 2015 found task information at the time of decision-making in the right 773 
dorso-medial PFC (Figure 4 B). In order to replicate this finding, we repeated all 4 task decoding analysis, 774 
only looking at the time of decision-making instead of intention maintenance (which was the reward 775 
feedback presentation in this experiment, see Materials and Methods for more details). The right dmPFC, 776 
as identified by Wisniewski and colleagues, was found to encode tasks also in the current study (baseline 777 
3.76%, SEM = 1.07%, BF10 = 51.27, t(34) = 3.51, p < 0.001, Figure 4 B). This was despite the fact that there 778 
were considerable differences in the overall experimental design of these two studies (e.g. 2 class vs. 3 779 
class decoding, changing reward outcomes vs. changing task difficulty). We found anecdotal evidence for 780 
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contingency-invariant task coding in this region (xclass 2.03%, SEM = 0.98%, BF10 = 2.35, t(34) = 2.07, p = 781 
0.02), although the baseline and xclass analyses did not differ (BF10 = 1.64, t(34) = 1.63, p = 0.11). 782 
Interestingly, the dmPFC was also found to encode reward outcome values, with its outcome signal being 783 
amplified by our contingency manipulation (Figure 3 A). This region thus simultaneously encoded both 784 
reward outcomes and the choices informed by these outcomes, highlighting its role in linking value to 785 
intention processing in the brain. Additionally, we found a double dissociation in task coding between the 786 
right dmPFC and left parietal cortex (Figure 4B), with the former only encoding tasks at the time of 787 
decision-making, and the latter only encoding tasks during intention maintenance. Please note that due a 788 
jittered inter-trial-interval, the decision-time and intention maintenance could be investigated 789 
independently. This dissociation was assessed statistically by performing an ANOVA on the accuracy 790 
values, using the factors ‘time in trial’ (time of decision vs intention maintenance) and ‘ROI’ (right dmPFC 791 
vs left parietal cortex). We found moderate evidence for a time x ROI interaction (BF10 = 5.39, F(1,34) = 792 
10.49, p = 0.04). Furthermore, the right dmPFC only encoded tasks at the time of decision (BF10 = 51.27, 793 
t(34) = 3.51, p < 0.001), but not during intention maintenance (BF10 = 0.68, t(34) = 1.28, p = 0.10). The left 794 
parietal cortex only encoded tasks during intention maintenance (BF10 > 150, t(34) = 4.20, p < 0.001), but 795 
not at time of decision (BF10 = 0.19, t(34) = 0.09, p = 0.46). This double dissociation thus suggests a 796 
temporal order of task processing in the brain, with the medial PFC transiently encoding chosen tasks at 797 
the time of decision-making, and the left parietal cortex then maintaining that information until the tasks 798 
can be executed. Lastly, we also assessed task information throughout the multiple demand network 799 
(Duncan, 2010; Woolgar et al., 2015), and found tasks to be encoded in a contingency-invariant format 800 
(Figure 4-1). 801 
Control analyses: In order to provide further support for our main results, we decided to perform a 802 
number of additional control analyses. First, we controlled for potential effects of RTs on task decoding 803 
results. It has been pointed out before, that task information in the brain can at least partly be explained 804 
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through RT effects (Todd et al., 2013). Although others have found no such effects (Woolgar et al., 2014), 805 
we decided to conservatively control for RT effects nonetheless, especially given that we found RT 806 
differences between tasks (see above). We thus repeated the task decoding analyses, only first regressing 807 
RT-related effects out of the data. We used the parietal and aMFG ROIs defined in the baseline analysis 808 
and tested whether task information was still present after controlling for potential RT effects. We still 809 
found the parietal cortex to encode tasks (4.61%, SEM = 0.65%, BF10 > 150, t(34) = 6.99, p < 0.001), and 810 
also found the task coding to be reward-invariant (4.03%, SEM = 0.76%, BF10 > 150, t(34) = 5.24, p < 811 
0.001). The same was true for the aMFG (4.66%, SEM = 0.89%, BF10 > 150, t(34) = 5.19, p < 0.001; and 812 
3.71%, SEM = 1.16%, BF10 = 23.38, t(34) = 3.18, p = 0.001; respectively). Results in the baseline and xclass 813 
analysis were equal in both regions, BFs10 >= 3.24, ts(34) < 0.67, ps > 0.25. These results thus mirror the 814 
main analysis above, showing that RT-related variance cannot explain task decoding results in our 815 
experiment.  816 
Although overall error rates were low and choice biases were largely absent, it was still possible that 817 
individual subjects showed excessively high error rates or strong choice biases, affecting task decoding 818 
results. The influence of individual subjects should be relatively small given our large sample size, but we 819 
still repeated the main analyses, excluding subjects with excessively high error rates and excessively 820 
strong choice biases. Additionally, we excluded subjects in which regressors could not be estimated from 821 
a sufficient number of trials (see Materials and Methods for more details). Using these highly conservative 822 
exclusion criteria, we removed an additional 12 subjects from the sample, leading to a sample size of 23 823 
subjects. Even though statistical power was considerably lower because of the smaller sample size, we 824 
were still able to detect task information in the parietal cortex (5.20%, SEM = 0.79%, BF10 >150, t(22) = 825 
6.54, p < 0.001), which was again reward-invariant (3.81%, SEM = 0.96%, BF10 = 96.61, t(22) = 3.93, p < 826 
0.001), and the same was true for the aMFG (5.03%, SEM = 1.09%, BF10 >150, t(22) = 4.60, p < 0.001, and 827 
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3.71%, SEM = 1.39%, BF10 = 7.34, t(22) = 2.66, p = 0.006, respectively). Therefore, neither error rates, nor 828 
choice biases can explain the reported task decoding results.  829 
In order to validate the decoding procedure, we also extracted task decoding accuracies from a region not 830 
involved in performing this task, the primary auditory cortex. As expected, we found accuracies not to 831 
differ from chance level in this region (-0.36%, SEM = 0.93%, BF01 = 7.22, t(34) = 0.38, p = 0.64), showing 832 
that the task decoding analysis was not biased towards positive accuracy values. Lastly, we empirically 833 
estimated the chance level of our decoding analysis using permutation tests, in order to rule out a biased 834 
chance level. The estimated chance level was 49.98%, which did not differ from the theoretical chance 835 
level of 50% (BF01 > 150, t(34999) = 0.41, p = 0.67). Thus, comparing our decoding accuracies against a 836 
chance level of 50% was valid.  837 
Discussion  838 
Here, we investigated the effects of control over choice outcomes on outcome valuation and choice 839 
implementation. Subjects performed a probabilistic reward reversal learning task, in which they had 840 
control over the outcomes of their choices. They also performed a free choice task with non-contingent 841 
reward outcomes, in which outcomes were not under their direct control. Although we found reward 842 
contingency to modulate outcome valuation, we found no effects on choice implementation. 843 
Furthermore, we found two main brain regions to be crucial for encoding tasks and reward outcomes: the 844 
right dmPFC and the left parietal cortex (around the IPS). The dmPFC was found to encode chosen tasks 845 
at the time of decision-making, and simultaneously encoded reward outcome values, emphasizing its role 846 
in linking value-related with intentional control processes.  While the parietal cortex encoded reward-847 
prediction errors at the time of decision-making, it encoded chosen tasks during a subsequent 848 
maintenance phase. We found a double dissociation between both regions, with the dmPFC encoding 849 
tasks only at the time of decision-making, and the parietal cortex only during intention maintenance.  850 
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Control over choice outcomes affects outcome valuation but not choice implementation  851 
Much previous research on the effects of reward motivation on cognition investigated the effects of 852 
reward prospect (Jimura et al., 2010; Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012). These findings demonstrated that 853 
positive reinforcement improves cognition, as compared to no reinforcement at all. However, an equally 854 
important and often overlooked property of reinforcement is the degree of control we have in reaching 855 
it. Sometimes, an action will cause on outcomes in a fairly clear way, other times, that link will be less 856 
close. Previous work on non-human primates has shown that the strength of such action-outcome 857 
contingencies modulates the neural processing of reward outcomes (Izquierdo et al., 2004; Chudasama 858 
et al., 2013). Our results show that this is also true in humans (see also Tricomi et al., 2004), and that 859 
neural representations of outcome values (and correlated processes) are amplified by reward 860 
contingency. Although somewhat weaker, evidence for reward learning signals points in the same 861 
direction. This is in line with predictions from gain-theories of motivation. It has been suggested that 862 
rewards increase the gain of subcortical dopaminergic neurons (Tobler et al., 2005), making them more 863 
sensitive to changes in rewards (see also Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003; Thurley et al., 2008). We directly 864 
demonstrate such gain increases, in subcortical dopaminergic regions and beyond.  865 
Importantly, in order for this value signal to lead to actual rewards, chosen behavior has to be 866 
implemented as intended first. One might thus expect contingency to lead to stronger task shielding and 867 
coding (Dreisbach and Wenke, 2011), as the costs of confusing both tasks are potentially high. However, 868 
we found no evidence for such effects. On the contrary, we found evidence for a similar or invariant coding 869 
of tasks across both contingency conditions. This finding informs current debates on the nature of task 870 
coding in the brain. On the one hand, some have argued for flexible task coding especially in the fronto-871 
parietal cortex (Woolgar et al., 2015; Qiao et al., 2017), often based on the multiple-demand network 872 
theory (Duncan, 2010). This account predicts that task coding should be stronger when task demands are 873 
high (Woolgar et al., 2015), or when correct performance is rewarded (Etzel et al., 2016). Despite our 874 
.CC-BY 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/375642doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Jul. 24, 2018; 
40 
 
efforts to replicate these findings in our data-set, we found no evidence for an influence of reward 875 
contingency on task coding. This was despite the fact that behavior differed between these conditions 876 
and that value-related signals were affected by reward contingency. One might argue that our analysis 877 
had insufficient statistical power to detect true effects, though we believe this to be unlikely. First, we 878 
decided to have a relatively large sample size (n=35). Second, additional control analyses showed that 879 
other analyses, matched for statistical power, do show significant results.  880 
On the other hand, others have argued that the same task representations could be used in multiple 881 
different situations (i.e. ‘multiplexing’ of task information), and that this allows us to flexibly react to novel 882 
and changing demands (Botvinick and Cohen, 2014). Multiplexing predicts that task information should 883 
be invariant across different contexts (Levine and Schwarzbach, 2017), which has been shown previously 884 
(Zhang et al., 2013; Wisniewski et al., 2016; Loose et al., 2017). Here, we replicate and extend these 885 
findings, by showing that tasks are encoded in an outcome-contingency-invariant format in frontal and 886 
parietal brain regions, strengthening the idea of multiplexing of task information in the brain. One possible 887 
alternative explanation for this finding might be that subjects were highly trained in performing the two 888 
tasks, and were at their performance ceiling. This might make a modulation of task coding too small to 889 
detect. Although we cannot fully exclude this interpretation, we want to point out that contingency did 890 
have robust effects on behavior. Also, most related previous experiments trained their subjects, those 891 
who found effects (Woolgar et al., 2015; Etzel et al., 2016) and those that did not (Wisniewski et al., 2016). 892 
We thus believe this alternative explanation to be unlikely. Overall, our task decoding results are in line 893 
with the idea of multiplexing of task information in the brain. Future research will have to test more 894 
directly which environmental conditions lead to multiplexing of task information in the brain, and which 895 
do not.  896 
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The roles of dmPFC and parietal cortex in value-related and task-related processes  897 
The dmPFC is a key region for decision-making in dynamic environments. It is supports effort-based 898 
foraging choices (Wisniewski et al., 2015b), and here we extend this finding by showing its involvement in 899 
a different task with different outcomes (reward reversal learning). The dmPFC is important for cognitive 900 
control, supporting rule and action selection (Rowe et al., 2008), working memory (Taylor et al., 2004), 901 
and processing uncertainty (Volz et al., 2003). It has further been associated with valuation processes, 902 
anticipating both positive and negative outcomes (Jensen et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2003), and encoding 903 
reward prediction errors (Vassena et al., 2014). In this experiment, we demonstrated that the dmPFC is 904 
specifically involved in encoding tasks only at the time at which a choice is made, other regions later 905 
maintain that choice outcome until it can be executed. We also demonstrated the dmPFC to encode 906 
outcome values at the same time. Please note that we do not claim this value signal to only represent the 907 
magnitude of reward outcomes, it might also represent related processes (e.g. attention). Nevertheless, 908 
the cause of this effect are different outcome values, and this highlights the importance of dmPFC in 909 
linking valuation to strategic decision-making, providing an explanation to how it might support goal-910 
directed behavior (Viard et al., 2011).  911 
The second key region identified in this experiment was the left parietal cortex, especially around the IPS. 912 
This brain region encodes prediction errors (Daw and Doya, 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2007; Katahira et al., 913 
2015), which might signal model updating (Behrens et al., 2007; Walton et al., 2007; Rutledge et al., 2010). 914 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the parietal cortex signals surprise, and does not reflect model 915 
updating (O’Reilly et al., 2013). Our findings are more in line with surprise signaling, the only brain region 916 
possibly involved in model updating in our experiment was the anterior medial PFC (see also Braem et al., 917 
2013). The parietal cortex is also a key region for cognitive control (Ruge et al., 2009), and working memory 918 
(Christophel et al., 2017). It is part of the multiple demand network (Duncan, 2010; Fedorenko et al., 919 
2013), a set of brain regions characterized by their high flexibility to adapt to changing demands. Previous 920 
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work on non-human primates demonstrated that the prefrontal cortex flexibly switches between 921 
representing different control-related information within single trials (Sigala et al., 2008; Stokes et al., 922 
2013). Our results show that the parietal cortex in humans exhibits similar flexibility. It switches between 923 
encoding control-related and value-related variables within single trials. This provides compelling 924 
evidence for the flexibility of the parietal cortex in adapting to rapidly changing task demands.  925 
Conclusion 926 
In this experiment, we assessed whether controlling outcomes affects outcome valuation and choice 927 
implementation in the brain. By comparing choices that are informed by expected outcomes as well as 928 
choices that are not, we linked largely parallel research on ‘free choice’ (Libet et al., 1983) and value-929 
based decision-making (Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007), which has been long overdue. While we found 930 
strong effects on outcome valuation, we found no such effects on choice implementation. Our results 931 
further highlight the importance of both the dmPFC and parietal cortex in bridging valuation and executive 932 
processes in the brain. Both regions have been involved in processing task choices and their reward 933 
outcomes, flexibly switching between encoding value-related and task-related information.    934 
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Supplementary Material 1128 
 1129 
Supplementary Figure 1: Correlation analysis. An additional exploratory analysis was performed to 1130 
correlate performance, questionnaire measures, and decoding accuracies (baseline task decoding, from 1131 
the parietal cortex cluster). Depicted are all pairwise correlations between % high reward choices in CR 1132 
trials (successCR), % high reward chocies in NCR trials (successNCR), motor impulsivity (BIS11motor), 1133 
attentional impulsivity (BIS11att), non-planning impulsivity (BIS11nonpl), behavioral inhibition (BIS), 1134 
behavioral approach (BAS), need for cognition (NFC), sensitivity to reward (SR), sensitivity to punishment 1135 
(SP), and decoding accuracies in the baseline task decoding analysis in the parietal cortex (%acc). The plot 1136 
was generated using the corrplot package in R. 1137 
Despite this descriptive approach, we also tested the strength of these correlations in a Bayesian 1138 
framework (using bayes.cor.test form the BayesianFirstAid package in R). Although our conclusions are 1139 
based on this correlation analysis, we also report classically estimated correlations and corresponding p-1140 
values for the interested reader. We expected successful performance to be correlated with higher need 1141 
for cognition, lower impulsivity, and higher sensitivity to reward. We also expected task coding to be 1142 
related to task performance, with better performance related to higher accuracies. Higher accuracies 1143 
could also be related to lower impulsivity, higher sensitivity to reward, and higher need for cognition. 1144 
Successful performance was correlated with impulsivity, as measured using the BIS11, r = -.34 (95%CI = [-1145 
.62 -.024]; classical estimation r = -.33, p = 0.052), with impulsive subjects being less successful in 1146 
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performing the reversal learning task. The BIS11 further splits impulsivity into three components: 1147 
attentional, motor, and non-planning impulsivity. The observed correlation was mostly driven by motor 1148 
impulsivity (r = -.45, 95%CI = [-.70 -.15]; r = -.47, p = 0.004), but not by non-planning (r = -.19, 95%CI = [-1149 
.52 .14]; r = -.20, p = 0.24) or attentional impulsivity (r = -.11, 95%CI = [-.45 .02]; r = -.11, p = 0.51). There 1150 
was no correlation of success with either sensitivity to reward (r = .04, 95%CI = [-.29 .38]; r = .06, p = 0.71), 1151 
or the need for cognition (r = .26, 95%CI = [-.07 .56]; r = .26, p = 0.11), despite the fact the need for 1152 
cognition seems to be associated with reward decision-making (Sandra and Otto 2018). A qualitatively 1153 
similar pattern was evident for decoding accuracies, extracted during intention maintenance from the 1154 
parietal cortex. Correlations with impulsivity (r = -.27, 95%CI = [-.57 .07]; r = -.32, p = 0.053), sensitivity to 1155 
reward (r = -.04, 95%CI = [-.38 .31], r = .17, p = 0.30), and need for cognition (r = .09, 95%CI = [-.24 .41]; r 1156 
= -.24, p – 0.16) were at least similar numerically to the correlations with task success. Given that the 1157 
evidence was somewhat weaker in this analysis, results should be interpreted with care however. Overall, 1158 
task performance and to a lesser degree decoding accuracies seem to be most strongly related to 1159 
impulsivity, and not to sensitivity to reward or need for cognition. This unexpected link to impulsivity 1160 
should be addressed directly in future research. 1161 
Sandra, D.A., & Otto A.R. (2018) Cognitive Capacity Limitations and Need for Cognition Differentially 1162 
Predict Reward-Induced Cognitive Effort Expenditure. Cognition, 172: 101–6.  1163 
 1164 
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 1165 
Supplementary Figure 2. Controlling RT-effects in reward outcome coding. We repeated the reward 1166 
outcome decoding analysis, using a similar first-level GLM to estimate signals (4 regressors: each 1167 
combination of high vs low reward, contingent vs non-contingent reward, locked to feedback onset). 1168 
Additionally, we added regressors of non-interest capturing RT-related variance in the data. The rest of 1169 
the analysis was identical to the reward outcome decoding analysis presented in the main body of the 1170 
text. Results from the reward outcome decoding analysis (red), and the same analysis with RT-related 1171 
effects regressed out of the data (blue) are depicted. As can be seen, the overlap between both analyses 1172 
is substantial. Results depicted at p < 0.05 (FWE, corrected at the voxel level). This indicates that 1173 
controlling for RT did not strongly alter our results.  1174 
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 1175 
Supplementary Figure 3. Task information in the multiple demand (MD) network. Depicted are task 1176 
decoding results in the bilateral functional ROIS provided by Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher (2013), 1177 
specifically the anterior insula (aINS), cerebellum, inferior frontal gyrus pars opercularis (IFGop), 1178 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), pre-central gyrus (precG), supplementary and pre-1179 
supplementary motor area (SMA/preSMA), as well as thalamus. Averaging across all MD regions, we 1180 
found strong evidence for the presence of task information (2.23%, SEM = 0.61%, BF10 = 69.08, t(34) = 1181 
3.63, p < 0.001, Figure 1). We then tested whether accuracies were higher in CR trials than in NCR trials, 1182 
using the same analysis as used for the regions identified in the main task decoding analysis. We found no 1183 
evidence for a higher accuracy in CR, as compared to NCR trials (BF10 = 0.37, t(34) = 0.68, p = 0.24). 1184 
Furthermore, we found task coding to be contingency-invariant, using a cross-classification approach 1185 
(2.02%, SEM = 0.67%, BF10 = 14.52, t(34) = 2.97, p = 0.002). Accuracies in the baseline and cross-1186 
classification analysis did not differ (BF10 = 5.11, t(34) = 0.40, p = 0.68). This suggests that the MD network 1187 
encodes tasks in a contingency-invariant fashion, and shows that the current context does not affect task 1188 
coding in the MD network. This is despite the clear effects contingency has on the coding of reward 1189 
outcomes.  1190 
Looking at individual MD regions, we found task information in the aINS (2.25%, SEM = 1.00%, BF10 = 1191 
3.23, t(34) = 2.24, p = 0.01), IPS (2.83%, SEM = 0.72%, BF10 = 131.02, t(34) = 3.88, p < 0.001), MFG (2.44%, 1192 
SEM = 0.90%, BF10 = 8.26, t(34) = 2.71, p = 0.005), precentral gyrus (2.48%, SEM = 0.87, BF10 = 9.86, t(34) 1193 
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= 2.79, p = 0.004), but not in the cerebellum (0.85%, SEM = 0.90%, BF10 = 0.44, t(34) = 0.94, p = 0.17), 1194 
IFGop (2.11%, SEM = 1.02%, BF10 = 2.31, t(34) = 2.06, p = 0.02) SMA/preSMA (1.48%, SEM = 1.07%, BF10 1195 
= 0.77, t(34) = 1.37, p = 0.08), and thalamus (0.58%, SEM = 1.06%, BF10 = 0.29, t(34) = 0.54, p = 0.29). 1196 
None of these regions showed a higher accuracy in CR than in NCR trials (BFs10 <= 0.60, ts(34) < 1.19, ps 1197 
> 0.12). However, in all of those regions the accuracy in the baseline and xclass analyses was equal (BFs10 1198 
>= 3.47, ts(34) < 1.00, ps > 0.32). In sum, we did not find our reward manipulation to affect task coding in 1199 
the MD network. We did find contingency-invariant task information in this network however. Also, not 1200 
all parts of the MD network seemed to be encoding tasks in our experiment.  1201 
Fedorenko E, Duncan J, Kanwisher N. 2013. Broad domain generality in focal regions of frontal and 1202 
parietal cortex. P Natl Acad Sci USA. 110:16616–16621.  1203 
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